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LAW
INSURANCE

I. COURT APPLIES UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTE
In Wausau Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Howser' the South Carolina
Supreme Court concluded that under the South Carolina uninsured motorist
statute, 2 an insurer was liable for gunshot injuries inflicted upon an insured
motorist during a vehicular chase by an unknown operator of an unidentified
vehicle. 3 The court further held that the presence of an independent witness
satisfied the conditions necessary to sue or recover under the uninsured
motorist provision, even though the gunshot, rather than actual physical
contact with the unknown vehicle, caused the insured's injuries. 4 The court's
conclusions directly contradicted an earlier analysis by the South Carolina
Federal District Court, which incorrectly assumed that South Carolina courts
would prefer a narrow construction of the uninsured motorist statute. 5 The
supreme court adopted a three-prong test to determine whether the insured's
injuries arose out of the "use" of her assailant's vehicle. The court concluded
that the insurer was liable for Howser's injuries because (1) a causal
connection existed between the unknown vehicle and Howser's injuries, (2) no
act of independent significance occurred to break that causal connection, and
(3) the unknown vehicle was used for transportation purposes. 6 The court's
articulation of this standard marked a departure from its traditional narrow
construction of state statutes and placed South Carolina law on the front lines
of the national war between injured motorists and their uninsured motorist
policy provisions.
On the night of June 13, 1989, Nancy Reece Howser and one passenger
were traveling on a public street when an unknown motorist bumped her
vehicle from behind, continued to pursue them, and then bumped her vehicle
twice more, at which time Howser accelerated her vehicle. The driver of the
other car then positioned his vehicle along the passenger side of Howser's
vehicle, pointed a pistol, and yelled at them to stop the car. Howser turned

1. _ S.C. _, 422 S.E.2d 106 (1992) (per curiam).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (involving injuries "arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use" of an uninsured vehicle).
3. Howser, __ S.C. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 108-09.
4. Id. at_,
422 S.E.2d at 109-10.
5. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser, 727 F. Supp. 999 (D.S.C. 1990), rev'd, 978
F.2d 1257 (4th Cir. 1992) (reversing the district court's opinion and certifying two questions to
the South Carolina Supreme Court for a determination of South Carolina law). In reaching this
assumption, the district court recognized that "the South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently
declared that uninsured motorist coverage should not by judicial interpretation be extended
beyond the plain intent of the statute." Howser, 978 F. Supp. at 1002 (footnote omitted).
6. Howser, __ S.C. at
, 422 S.E.2d at 108-09.
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left onto a side street to avoid the assault. As she completed her turn, the
unidentified motorist shot at the, rear of her vehicle. One bullet entered the
rear of the vehicle, fragmented, pierced Howser's seat, and entered her back
in three places. Howser stopped the vehicle and then lost consciousness.
Neither the gunman nor his vehicle was ever identified. Howser's injuries
resulted solely from the gunshot, and neither Howser nor her passenger was
injured from the contact of the two vehicles. 7
Howser initially filed a "John Doe" action in the Richland County Court
of Common Pleas, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provision
of her father's insurance policy. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Company
("Wausau") then brought an action in South Carolina District Court seeking
a declaration that the policy did not cover Howser's injuries. 8 After
considering both parties' motions for summary judgment, the district court
granted Wausau's motion for summary judgment ruling that Howser's injuries
did not arise out of the "use" of an uninsured vehicle, 9 a prerequisite to
recovery under South Carolina's uninsured motorist statute.'0
Howser appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit certified the following two questions to the South Carolina Supreme
Court to determine the correct application of South Carolina law:
1. "Is the insurer liable under the uninsured motorist provision involving
injuries 'arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use' of an
uninsured vehicle (Section 38-7[7]-140, S.C. Code Ann.) for gunshot
injuries sustained by a person traveling on a public highway in an insured
vehicle and inflicted during a vehicular chase by an unknown owner or
operator of an unidentified vehicle?"
2. "Is, under the circumstances of this case, subsection 2 of Section 3877-170 ('Conditions to sue or recover under uninsured motorist provision
. . .') satisfied by the presence of an independent witness to the accident
causing the injury of the defendant in this case, even though the injury was
not caused by 'physical contact with the unknown vehicle?'""
Carolina Supreme Court responded affirmatively to both quesThe South
2
tions.'
To determine an insurer's liability for gunshot injuries inflicted during a
vehicular chase, the South Carolina Supreme Court examined the meaning of

7. Howser, 727 F. Supp. at 1000.
8. Id. at 1000-01.
9. Id. at 1006.
10. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
11. Howser, __ S.C. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 107 (quoting certification of Fourth Circuit).
12. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 107.
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the word "use" in South Carolina's uninsured motorist statute. 13 Under
South Carolina's uninsured motorist statute, Wausau would be liable for
Howser's injuries if her injuries arose out of the "ownership, maintenance, or
use" of an uninsured vehicle. " Lacking relevant South Carolina case law to
assist the court in construing the statute, the court looked to other jurisdictions
for a definition of "use" as applied in uninsured motorist policy provisions. 5
The court found the Minnesota Supreme Court's reasoning in Continental
Western Insurance Co. v. Klug'6 not only persuasive, but precisely on
point. 7 The court adopted Klug's three-prong test and held Wausau liable
for Howser's injuries.'" The court first considered whether a causal
connection existed between Howser's injuries and her assailant's vehicle. 19
The court stated that "[tihe causation required is something less than proximate
cause and something more than the vehicle being the mere site of the
injury."20 The court reasoned that with regard to Howser's injuries, "[tihe
gunshot was the culmination of an ongoing assault, in which the vehicle played
an essential and integral part."2 The court further stated "that the unknown
Although the gunshot
vehicle was an active accessory to this assault."'
proximately caused Howser's injuries, the court concluded that "a sufficient
causal connection exist[ed] between the use of the assailant's vehicle and
Howser's injuries. "I
After establishing the causal connection, the court questioned whether an
"act of independent significance" occurred to break the causal link.24 The
court noted that Howser's assailant used his vehicle to pursue Howser and to
place himself into a position from which he could shoot her.' Stating that
13. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 108.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (Law Co-op. 1989).
15. Howser, __ S.C. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 108. The district court had noted that Howser's
case was the first in South Carolina in which insurance coverage was "sought for gunshot injuries
suffered during a vehicular chase." Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser, 727 F. Supp. 999,
1003 (D.S.C. 1990), rev'd, 978 F.2d 1257 (4th Cir. 1992).
16. 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1987). In Klug an identified but uninsured motorist pursued
Russel Klug, "rammed" his vehicle, and shot him in the left arm. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found Continental Western Insurance Company liable for Klug's injuries because (1) a causal
connection existed between Klug's injuries and the use of an uninsured vehicle, (2) no act of
independent significance broke that connection, and (3) the uninsured car was used for
transportation purposes. Id. at 877-79.
17. Howser, __ S.C. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 108.
18. Id. at__, 422 S.E.2d at 108-09.
, 422 S.E.2d at 108.
19. Id. at
, 422 S.E.2d at 108 (citing Klug, 415 N.W.2d at 878).
20. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 108.
21. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 108.
22. Howser, __ S.C. at _,
23. Id. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 108.
, 422 S.E.2d at 108.
24. Id. at
422 S.E.2d at 108.
25. Id. at,
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"the unknown driver's use of his vehicle and the shooting were inextricably
linked as one continuing assault," the court concluded that no independent act
interrupted the causal connection between Howser's injuries and her assailant's
use of his vehicle.26
The third prong of Klug's analysis limited the use of the uninsured vehicle
to the purposes of providing transportation.2 7 The court declined to determine whether South Carolina law mandated this requirement.2 8 However, the
court reasoned that because Howser's assailant used his vehicle to provide
transportation, each element of the Kug analysis was satisfied.29 Based on
this reasoning, the court concluded that Howser's injuries "arose out of the use
30
of her assailant's vehicle."
Because Howser's assailant was unidentified, the court also needed to
determine whether the presence of an independent witness to the accident
satisfied South Carolina's statutory requirements to sue or recover under the
uninsured motorist provision.31 South Carolina law currently provides that
an insured may recover for injuries inflicted by an unidentified, uninsured
motorist if the injury "was caused by physical contact with the unknown
vehicle, or the accident. . . [was] witnessed by someone other than the owner
or operator of the insured vehicle. "32 The court reasoned that this section of
the statute was designed to ensure that "the accident involved a second
unknown vehicle." 33 The court recognized the legislature's determination
that "an independent witness is sufficient to reduce the possibility of false
claims." 3 4 The court concluded that "no physical contact with the unknown
vehicle is necessary when a witness other than the owner or driver of the
insured vehicle is available to attest to the facts of the accident.""
The Kug analysis apparently sets forth an unambiguous standard by
which uninsured motorist policy provisions apply to injuries similar to
Howser's. However, the articulation of this standard, which concededly

26. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 109.
27. Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn. 1987).
28. Howser, _ S.C. at_ n.2, 422 S.E.2d at 109 n.2. The court stated, "The third prong
of the Kug analysis requires the use of the vehicle be limited to that of providing transportation.
Here the vehicle was being used for transportation. Thus, we need not determine whether this
element is mandated under our law." Id. Recently, however, the supreme court construed the
uninsured motorist provision to limit "use" to transportation uses. Canal Ins. Co. v. Insurance
Co. of North America,
S.C. _, 431 S.E.2d 577 (1993).
29. Howser, __ S.C. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 109.
30. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 109 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 109.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-170 (2) (Law. Co-op. 1989 & Supp. 1992).
33. Howser, ._ S.C. at
, 422 S.E.2d at 109 (citing Coker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 251
S.C. 175, 161 S.E.2d 175 (1968)).
34. Id. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 109.
35. Id. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 110.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/12
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"defies a simple test,"36 has aligned courts nationwide into two distinct camps
of legal theory. In virtually every case involving this issue, the courts
attempted to define the term "use" by determining the cause of the injury and
the role played by the uninsured vehicle in relation thereto. The degree of
causation required to establish liability and to ensure recovery for such injuries
sharply divides the available case law. Courts adhering to a narrow view of
causation hold that injuries caused by gunshots during a vehicular chase do not
arise out of the use of an uninsured vehicle. 7 Other courts follow the more
expansive view of causation set forth in Kug and hold that injuries caused by
the use of an uninsured vehicle are covered under uninsured motorists
statutes.3 In Howser the South Carolina Supreme Court moved away from
the narrow interpretation and towards the more expansive theory. Although
Howser appears to produce a bright line test to clarify South Carolina's statute,
it is helpful to consider (1) the theories of causation the court rejected, (2)
what theories the court embraced as fundamental to its decision, and (3) the
impact this case will have on recovery available under uninsured motorist
provisions both in South Carolina and nationwide.
The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
rendered the first opinion in the Howser case. 39 The district court anticipated
that the state supreme court would interpret the statute by examining its "plain
intent" and looking no farther than the face of the statute.4" The district
court further assumed that under such a narrow construction, the statute
required Howser to prove that her assailant's vehicle caused her injury and
that the injury arose out of the use of his vehicle. 4' The district court
adopted a tough standard which required the causal connection to be "'more
than incidental, fortuitous, or but for,'" and that the injury be "'foreseeably
identifiable with the normal use of a motor vehicle.' "" Based on this
analysis, the court reasoned that "a shooting injury is not foreseeably
identifiable with the normal use of a vehicle. "'3 Therefore, the court rejected
the broader theory that would have considered the gunman's vehicle an "active
accessory" to Howser's assault.' Rather, the district court formulated a
36. Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 877 (Minn. 1987).
37. E.g., Coleman v. Sanford, 521 So. 2d 876 (Miss. 1988). For a list of other cases so
holding, see Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser, 727 F. Supp. 999, 1003 nn.6, 7 (D.S.C.
1990), rev'd, 978 F.2d 1257 (4th Cir. 1992).
38. E.g., Ganiron v. Hawaii Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 744 P.2d 1210 (Haw. 1987). For a list of
other cases so holding, see Howser, 727 F. Supp. at 1003 n.6.
39. 727 F. Supp. 999.
40. Id. at 1002.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1005 (emphasis added) (quoting Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Higginbotham,
290 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), quoted in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v Brown, 779
F.2d 984, 989 (4th Cir. 1985)).
43. Id. at 1006 (citing Brown, 779 F.2d at 989).
44. Howser, 727 F. Supp. at 1005. The broader theory was developed by the following two
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restrictive standard for recovery under the uninsured motorist statute. The
court concluded that "Howser's injuries did not arise out of the use of the
gunman's automobile as an automobile and that the gunman's vehicle, although
it helped him to pursue Howser, did not itself produce her injuries. " "
Accordingly, the court held that section 38-77-140 did not cover Howser's
injury.46

Although the supreme court abandoned the district court's findings in

favor of a more relaxed construction of South Carolina's uninsured motorist
statute, strong arguments supporting the district court's conclusions still remain
in other jurisdictions. The dissenting opinion of Colorado's Chief Justice
Rovira in Cung La v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. 47 contains one
of the most persuasive arguments. Chief Justice Rovira vehemently opposed
the Colorado Supreme Court's adoption of a more liberal definition of "use"
as applied in uninsured motorists provisions. He argued that the Cung La case
should have been decided "under the contract principle of examining the
meaning and intent of the words in the contractual provision. "I Chief
Justice Rovira favored the acceptance of a general test for causation that would
link a vehicle and an injury only if "'the injury was foreseeably identifiable
with the normal use, maintenance and ownership of the vehicle.' ,"4 Under
this test, an uninsured motorist policy would not cover injuries such as those
injuries sustained by Howser. Chief Justice Rovira's analysis would prevent
Howser's recovery because her injuries resulted from the use of a firearm, not
the use of a vehicle. 50 "'Use, as contemplated by the automobile liability
policy, means use of a vehicle as such, not a use foreign to its inherent

cases: (1) Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Munoz, 245 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding
coverage existed "because the car in which the gunman was riding was a substantial factor in the
shooting death)," and (2) Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1987)
(finding coverage because the gunman's uninsured vehicle was an "active accessory" in the
assault).
45. Howser, 727 F. Supp. at 1006.
46. Id.; see S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
47. 830 P.2d 1007 (Colo. 1992) (en bane). In Cung La an insured motorist was involved in
an altercation with a group of gang members. A week later, one of the gang members shot the
insured while driving on a highway. The assailant's vehicle was one of three cars used to block
the victim's car into the right lane. The victim sustained a gunshot wound to the head, lost
control of the car, and was struck by a third vehicle. The insured motorist claimed injuries from
both the gunshot wound and the resulting collision. The supreme court held that the insured was
entitled to have the merits of his claim heard and reversed the grant of summary judgment for
the insurer. Id. at 1012-13.
48. Id. at 1017 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (citing Titan Constr. Co. v. Nolf, 515 P.2d 1123,
1126 (Colo. 1973) (en bane)).
49. Id. at 1014 (quoting 1 IRVIN E.SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, at 2-7
(2d ed. rev. 1993)).
50. See id. at 1017 (discussing lack of automobile insurance coverage for firearm injuries
sustained by an insured while in a motor vehicle).
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purpose, to which the vehicle might conceivably be put.'"'
Rovira noted that in cases in which

[Vol. 45
Chief Justice

the injuries do not bear any "apparent relation to the operation of the
vehicle or to the use to which it was being put" but instead result "from
a deliberate assault which took place in a vehicle simply because that is
where the [victims] happened to be when the assailant came 'gunning' for
[them]," there is insufficient causal connection between the use of the
52
vehicle and the injury.
Ultimately, Chief Justice Rovira reached a conclusion similar to the district
court's decision in Howser and advocated that "an analysis that requires a
causal relationship between the injury and the use of the automobile and a use
contemplated by the policy" is the best test for determining whether an injured
party may recover under an uninsured motorist provision. 3 Accordingly,
although Howser's assailant "used" his vehicle to pursue Howser and to place
himself into a position from which he could shoot her, Howser's injuries
remained unrelated to the gunman's use of his vehicle for transportation
purposes.
Both the district court in Howser and Chief Justice Rovira's dissent in
Cung La favor a more limited determination of causation that renders proof
that an injury arose out of the "use" of a vehicle more difficult. These
opinions, along with others employing a similar analysis, adhere to the oldfashioned rules of narrowly construing the terms of statutes and policy
provisions. By requiring (1) that uninsured vehicle cause the insured's injury
and (2) that the injury result from a normal use of the vehicle as contemplated
by either statute or policy, the reasoning illustrated by these cases virtually
eliminates recovery for Howser-type injuries in all instances, unless the injury
results from direct physical contact with an uninsured vehicle used for
transportation purposes. Uninsured motorist carriers strongly favor such
conclusions because they forsake the established rule requiring strict
construction of insurance policies against the insurer. However, these
decisions meet sharp opposition from more recent opinions, which loosen the
causation requirement allowing recovery without proof of physical contact with
54
an uninsured vehicle or proof of a contemplated "use" of that vehicle.

51. Id. (quoting Azar v. Employers Casualty Co., 495 P.2d 554, 555 (Colo. 1972) (en banc)).
52. Cung La, 830 P.2d at 1015 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Bennett v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 318 S.E.2d 670, 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)).
53. Id. at 1018.
54. E.g., Ruiz v. Farmers Ins. Co., 847 P.2d 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). In Ruiz Angela
Ruiz sustained injuries from a gunshot fired from an uninsured vehicle, while traveling as a
passenger in an insured vehicle. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the insurance companies. Id. at 116. In reaching its conclusion, the court
relied on Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1987). Id.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court took a bold step in abandoning the
district court's theory in favor of the more expansive Kug analysis. Although
at first glance Kug's three-prong test appears more regimented than the
narrower theories, Kug actually frees the court to allow recovery under a now
broader interpretation of both state statute and uninsured motorist policy
provisions.
By rejecting the district court's "foreseeably identifiable use" theory of
causation, the court established case law precedent disfavoring insurance
companies which face claims under uninsured motorist provisions.. South
Carolina law mandates that all automobile policies issued in the state provide
uninsured motorist protection "to pay the injured all sums which he is legally
entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
However, the court loosened the standard of causation
motor vehicle."'
necessary to prove that the injury arose out of the "use" of an uninsured
vehicle. The court's broad definition of "use" is consistent with other
jurisdictions which construe "use" as "a general catchall term not limited to
the ordinary use of the automobile."56 Under this interpretation, "[a]ny
exercise of control over the vehicle constitutes a use, regardless of its purpose,
extent, or duration."" Applying this idea specifically to injuries inflicted
during a vehicular chase, the court embraced the innovative expansion of
statute interpretation initiated in Kug. The Howser court severely reduced the
degree of causation needed to establish that the alleged injury arose out of the
use of the vehicle. Consequently, the court found a causal link between
Howser's injuries and her assailant's vehicle, even though use of a vehicle for
a criminal assault was not "foreseen or expected. ""
The Howser court used this broader perception of causation to tailor a
cloak of protection for Howser and other similarly situated claimants seeking
recovery under the uninsured motorist statute. The court loosely defined the
causation standard as one requiring "something less than proximate cause and
something more than the vehicle being the mere site of the injury."" The

55. S.C. CODE. ANN. § 38-77-150 (Law. Co-op. 1989).
56. GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANcE LAW § 45:64 (Ronald A.
Anderson & Mark S. Rhodes eds., 2d rev. ed. 1981) (footnote omitted).
57. Id.
,
,422 S.E.2d 106, 108
58. See Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser, _ S.C.
(1992) (per curiam).
[I]n determining whether the negligent act that caused a bodily injury arose out of the
"use" of a motor vehicle within the coverage of a motor vehicle liability policy, the
court must consider whether it was a natural and reasonable incident or consequence
of the use of the vehicle for the purposes shown by the declarations, though not
foreseen or expected.
COUCH, supra note 56, at § 45:56 (footnote omitted).
59. Howser,_ S.C. at _, 422 S.E.2d at 108 (citing Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415
N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1987)).
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court then characterized the use of Howser's assailant's vehicle as an
"essential and integral part" of an "ongoing assault."'
By expanding its
theory of causation, the court also expanded the possible uses of an uninsured
vehicle which might trigger an insurer's statutory liability. Given this broad
reading of "use," it is not surprising that the court found a sufficient causal
connection existed between Howser's injuries and her assailant's vehicle.
Nor is it surprising that the court found that "no independent act occurred
to break the causal link" between Howser's injuries and her assailant's
vehicle.61 According to the court's analysis, the use of an automobile for a
criminal assault would entitle the victim of the assault to recovery under South
Carolina's uninsured motorist statute, even though such use is neither normal
nor foreseeable. This theory renders it unlikely that a court will find an act
of independent significance sufficient to break the causal link because the court
incorporated the act causing the injury (the gunshot) into the act of "using" the
vehicle (pursuing the victim prior to the assault). Therefore, the court would
be unable to find that an "'independent act or intervening cause wholly
disassociated from, independent of and remote from the use of the automobile"' caused the injury. 62 The court's broad conception of "use" includes
virtually all imaginable independent causes. Thus, the court found it
unnecessary to determine whether Howser's assailant used his vehicle for
transportation purposes because under the court's analysis, any use of the
vehicle was sufficient to establish causation.
Because the court abruptly shifted from a view favoring insurers to one
which essentially exposes them to endless liability under uninsured motorists
provisions, the court's analysis produces skepticism. However, it remains
essential to remember that no middle ground exists between the restrictive and
the more expansive approaches to the issues set forth in Howser. The Howser
court did more than jump on the Klug bandwagon-it took the lead from
Minnesota and brought a loose causation standard into a new realm of
litigation. Although it is still too early to make accurate predictions of South
Carolina's impact on other jurisdictions, it is clear that the Ktug analysis
impacts the reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions. In Ruiz v. Farmers
Insurance Co.,63 decided only two weeks after Howser, the Arizona Court
of Appeals faced facts almost identical to those found in Howser. The Ruiz
court, like the district court in Howser and Chief Justice Rovira in Cung La,
construed the uninsured motorist statute according to the plain meaning of the
language used.' However, unlike the South Carolina District Court and

60. Id. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 108.
61. Id. at_, 422 S.E.2d at 109.
,422 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting Hite v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 288 S.C.
62. Id. at
616, 621, 344 S.E.2d 173, 176-77 (Ct. App. 1986)).
63. 847 P.2d 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); see supra note 54.
64. Ruiz, 830 P.2d at 115.
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Chief Justice Rovira, the Ruiz court found that such a construction would
allow a broad definition of "use" as it applied in the statute.65 The court
rejected the narrow theory requiring that the vehicle involved be the proximate
cause of the injury.' The court of appeals then followed the same analysis
of Kiug that was adopted by South Carolina.67
The Howser decision clearly placed South Carolina law on the front lines
of the battle between insured drivers and the terms of their uninsured motorist
policy provisions. By tailoring a causation standard to fit its broad definition
of "use," the court opened the possibility for recovery to even more potential
claimants. The question then becomes one of degree, for it is speculative at
this point just how far the court will go when presented with facts which
involve remote links between injuries and the use of the vehicles.
JaniceM. Baker

II. MISREPRESENTATIONS IN LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
In Carroll v. Jackson National Life Insurance Co.,' the South Carolina
Supreme Court addressed a novel insurance issue. In a unanimous opinion
written by Justice Toal, the court concluded that when an individual makes
material misrepresentations in an application for life insurance and subsequently dies within the two-year contestability period, the insurer may void the
policy ab initio and thereby avoid liability without having to prove a causal
connection between the insured's cause of death and the material misrepresentations.2 While admitting this was a new issue, the court departed from a
history of cases requiring a causal connection between a policy exclusion and
loss.3 In so ruling, South Carolina joined the majority of states that do not
demand such a causal link.4
The facts of the case were largely undisputed. Mary Louise Carroll,
daughter and beneficiary of the decedent, brought an action to recover on two
$50,000 life insurance policies issued to her father by the defendant.' Jackson
65. Id. at 115-16.
66. id. at 116.
67. Id.
1. 307 S.C. 267, 414 S.E.2d 777 (1992).

2. Id. at 269, 414 S.E.2d at 778.
3. See Johnson v. South State Ins. Co., 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986); South
Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977); McGee v. Glove Indem.
Co., 173 S.C. 380, 175 S.E. 849 (1934); Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 166 S.C. 214,
164 S.E. 602 (1932).
4. Carroll, 307 S.C. at 270, 414 S.E.2d at 778.
5. Carroll v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 304 S.C. 491,492, 405 S.E.2d 425, 426 (Ct. App.
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National Life Insurance Company ("Jackson National") claimed it could avoid
liability because the insured made material misrepresentations about his health
history in his policy application. Jackson National did not attempt to rescind
the contract, but instead denied recovery based on these alleged misrepresentations. The trial court granted Carroll's motion for summary judgment after
Jackson National admitted it could not prove a causal connection between the
misrepresentations and the cause of death. 6 In affirming the trial court's
decision, the court of appeals held that the supreme court intended its analysis
in Johnson v. South State Insurance Co.7 to apply to life insurance questions. 8 However, this reliance proved wrong. Jackson National appealed,
and the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision and voided the
policy. 9 Justice Toal's opinion couched the issue as "whether an alleged
material misrepresentation in the application for life insurance which may
render the policy void must be causally connected to the death of the
insured." 1" The court reasoned that no such link is required when an insurer
successfully proves all five elements of fraudulent misrepresentation stated in
Strickland v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America.II Further, the court
interpreted South Carolina Code Section 38-63-220(d) as mandating that an

insurance company must challenge an application's veracity within the first
two years following the policy's issuance.12 Finally, the court noted that
1991), rev'd, 307 S.C. 267, 414 S.E.2d 777 (1992); Brief of Appellant at 1.
6. Carroll, 304 S.C. at 493, 405 S.E.2d at 426.
7. 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986).
8. Carroll, 304 S.C. at 494-95, 405 S.E.2d at 426-27. Johnson concerned property loss
sustained under a fire policy issued on a valid application. The court denied recovery for lost
contents, but not the dwelling itself, because the insured made fraudulent misrepresentations in
the contents claim. The Johnson court observed: "Regarding other types of insurance, this Court
has consistently held that an insurer must establish a causative link between a policy exclusion
and a loss before recovery may be defeated." Johnson, 288 S.C. at 241-42,341 S.E.2d at 794.
9. Carroll,307 S.C. at 267, 414 S.E.2d at 777.
10. Id. at 270 n.1, 414 S.E.2d at 778 n.1. But cf. supra note 7 and accompanying text
(demonstrating the court of appeal's application of Johnson to life insurance policies).
11. Id. at 270, 414 S.E.2d at 778; see Strickland, 278 S.C. 82, 86-87, 292 S.E.2d 301, 304
(1982) ("In order to vitiate a policy on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentation, it is necessary
that the insurer show not only the falsity of the statement challenged, but also that the falsity was
known to the applicant, was material to the risk, made with the intent to defraud the insurer, and
relied upon by the insurer in issuing the policy. This burden must be fulfilled by the insurer by
clear and convincing evidence." (citations omitted)). Although this court cites Stricklandfor the
test, the courts have applied the same elements consistently since Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v.
Beckham, 240 S.C. 450, 126 S.E.2d 342 (1962).
12. Carroll, 307 S.C. at 269, 414 S.E.2d at 778. All individual life insurance policy
provisions must adhere to the requirements of § 38-63-220. Subsection (d) declares a policy
"incontestable as to the truth of the application for insurance and to the representations of the
insured individual after they have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of
two years from their date of issue. . . If an insurer institutes proceedings to vacate a policy on
the ground of the falsity of the representations contained in the application for the policy, the
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unlike some states, South Carolina does not have a statute that requires an
insurer to establish a causative link between death and misrepresentation in
order to void a life insurance policy.' 3 While adopting the majority rule,14
the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Carroll amounts to a peek
inside Pandora's Box on this issue. At first glance, Carrollappears inconsistent with the line of cases beginning in 1932 with Reynolds v. Life & Casualty
Insurance Co. 5 and culminating in Johnson v. South State Insurance Co..16
While apparently disparate, the results are indeed reconcilable. Johnson and
the cases cited therein, regarding causal elements, generally involved property
losses. 7 The principal inconsistency lies in the supreme court's change of

proceedings must commence within the time permitted in this subsection." S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 38-63-220(d) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
13. Carroll, 307 S.C. at 269-70, 414 S.E.2d at 778.
14. See 1A JOHN A. APPLEMSAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 245, at 125 (1981). For
a list of other cases cited by the appellant that hold a causal connection is not required, see Brief
of Appellant at 5-7 (citing Martin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 192 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1951)
(applying Georgia law); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Morairty, 178 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950) (decided under Arizona law); Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
103 F.2d 439 (1st Cir.) (applyingMaine law), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 572 (1939); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Simons, 60 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.) (interpreting Massachusetts law), cert. denied, 287
U.S. 648 (1932); Tedder v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 436 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.C. 1977)
(interpreting North Carolina law); Hofmann v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 400 F. Supp.
827 (D. Md. 1975) (interpreting Maryland law); Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Cowger,
748 S.W.2d 332 (Ark. 1988); Torbensen v. Family Life Ins. Co., 329 P.2d 596 (Cal. App.
1958); Benson v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 362 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1961); Jones v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America, 388 A.2d 476 (D.C. 1978); Hatch v. Woodmen Accident & Life Co., 409
N.E.2d 540 (IIl. App. Ct. 1980); Bush v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 534 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 90 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1935); Radosta v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 163 So. 2d 177 (La. Ct. App.), writ refused, 165 So.2d 483
(1964); Wickersham v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. 1982);
Howard v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 272 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1978); Amoskeag Trust Co. v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 185 A. 2 (N.H. 1936); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Manzo, 584 A.2d 190 (N.J. 1991); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Anaya, 428 P.2d 640
(N.M. 1967); Greene v. United Mut. Life Ins. Co., 238 N.Y.S.2d 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963),
aff'd 258 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965); Shafer v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
189 A.2d 234 (Pa. 1963); Bushfield v. World Mut. Health & Accident Ins. Co., 123 N.W.2d
327 (S.D. 1963); Montgomery v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 585 S.W.2d 620 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979);
Robinson v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 554 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), aff'd, 569 S.W.2d
28 (Tex. 1978); Berger v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986); McAllister
v. AVEMCO Ins. Co., 528 A.2d 758 (Vt. 1987); Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v.
Alley, 187 S.E. 456 (Va. 1936); Yurk v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 219 N.W.2d 561 (VWis.
1974)).
15. 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932).
16. 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986).
17. See Kerr v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 552 F. Supp. 992 (D.S.C. 1982), aff'd in
part,rev'd in part,731 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1984) (fire insurance policy); South Carolina Ins. Co.
v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977) (aircraft liability policy); McGee v. Glove
Indem. Co., 173 S.C. 380, 175 S.E. 849 (1934) (automobile insurance); Reynolds v. Life &
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heart from its opinion in Johnson to Carroll.8 Yet, once the Reynolds case
is factually distinguished, only dicta remains to support the proposition that a
causal link necessarily applies to life insurance.
Both the appellant and the supreme court regarded the Carroll issue as
one of first impression. 9 However, the novelty of the issue may be
attributed to Justice Toal's framing the issue differently than that addressed by
the court of appeals. Judge Gardner's court of appeals' opinion considered the
issue to be "whether a life insurer must prove a causal connection between a
misrepresentation pertaining to health history and death before coverage can
be voided."20 On the other hand, Justice Toal may have predetermined the
supreme court's result by commenting:
The Court of Appeals correctly noted ... that this Court held in Johnson
v. South State Insurance Co. "that an insurer must establish a causative
link between a policy exclusion and a loss before recovery may be
defeated." However, the requirement of a causal connection between an
exclusion in a valid policy and the loss is not the issue here. The issue
here is whether an alleged materialmisrepresentationin the applicationfor
life insurancewhich may render thepolicy void must be causally connected
to the death of the insured.2'
Unlike Reynolds, Johnson, and their kindred, Carrolldid not focus on policy
exclusions or fraudulent claims within the context of a valid policy. Instead,
Jackson National sought to void the contract entirely, claiming defects at its
inception.
One issue that remains for clarification is the role of the insurance agent
when fraud is asserted. As a practical matter, insurance agents often fill out
the insurer's application for insurance to reflect the applicant's oral answers.
For example, in Atlantic Life Insurance Co. v. Beckhan22 evidence showed

Casualty Ins. Co., 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602 (1932) (holding that for a life insurance policy

containing a provision to avoid liability if the insured dies while violating the law, a causal link
must exist between the violation and the cause of the death).
18. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. The court of appeals was certainly justified in
following Johnson'sdicta, stating that the causative elements should be applied uniformly when
an insurer denies liability based on a claim of fraud or misrepresentation. Johnson, 288 S.C. at
241-42, 341 S.E.2d at 794.
19. Carroll,307 S.C. at 269-70,414 S.E.2d at 778; see also Brief of Appellant at 3 (stating
South Carolina has never required an insurer to prove a causal connection between a
misrepresentation and a death).
20. Carroll v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 304 S.C. 491,492, 405 S.E.2d 425,426 (Ct. App.
1991), rev'd, 307 S.C. 270, 414 S.E.2d 777 (1992).
21. Carroll,307 S.C. at 270 n.1, 414 S.E.2d at 778 n.1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(quoting Johnson v. South State Ins. Co., 288 S.C. 239, 341 S.E.2d 793 (1986)).
22. 240 S.C. 450, 126 S.E.2d 342 (1962).
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that the insurer's agent persuaded Beckham to apply for a policy and that
another agent, a doctor doubling as Beckham's family physician, actually filled
out the application.3 In Carrollthe court of appeals advocated a second part
to the Strickland test to be applied when an insurance agent's actions are
questionable.24 In addition to the Strickland elements, the court of appeals
stated that "misrepresentations can be waived by negligence or fraud on the
part of the agent of an insurance company unless the policy itself has contrary
provisions. "I
Typically, absent collusion by the insured, fraudulent
misrepresentations by the insurer's agent are chargeable to the insurer, not the
insured.26

The possibility of fraud by the insurance agent raises a larger evidentiary
question. The court of appeals alluded to the problem of defending against a
charge of fraud after the alleged defrauder is dead and cited Small v. Coastal
States Life Insurance Co.27 for the rule that a policy should not be forfeited
after the event creating liability. 2 Small involved a claim under health insurance policies, in which the insurer alleged that the claimant misrepresented his
health in the application. The Small court found that misrepresentations made
in good faith without an intent to deceive would not serve as grounds for
policy avoidance. 29 Further, and more importantly, the Small court stated
that "if an insurance company, at the inception of the contract of insurance,
has knowledge of facts which render the policy void at its option, and the
company delivers the policy as a valid policy, it is estopped to assert such
ground of forfeiture."30 With a causation requirement, misrepresentations
not linked to the cause of death are of little consequence. 3 Under the
Strickland test, a misrepresentation must be "made with the intent to defraud

23. Id. at 457, 126 S.E.2d at 344-345.
24. See Carroll,304 S.C. at 494, 405 S.E.2d at 427.
25. Id. (citing Berry v. Virginia State Am. Co., 83 S.C. 13, 64 S.E. 859 (1909)); see also
Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Beckham, 240 S.C. at 456, 126 S.E.2d at 344 (finding issuance of a
policy upon incomplete or unanswered questions on an application waives any objections thereto).
26. See generally B. H. Glenn, Annotation, Insured's Responsibility for False Answers
Insertedby Insurer'sAgent in Application Following CorrectAnswers by Insured, or Incorrect
Answers Suggested by Agent, 26 A.L.R.3D 6 (1969); see also Small v. Coastal States Life Ins.
Co., 241 S.C. 344, 128 S.E.2d 175 (1962) (holding insurer liable for agent's knowledge of the
insured's previous medical history in spite of the insured's possible misrepresentations).
27. 241 S.C. 344, 128 S.E.2d 175 (1962).
28. See Carroll, 304 S.C. at 494, 405 S.E.2d at 427 (citing Small v. Coastal Life Ins. Co.,
241 S.C. 244, 128 S.E.2d 175 (1962)).
29. Small v. Coastal Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 344, 348, 128 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1962).
30. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Fludd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 75 S.C. 315, 55
S.E. 762 (1906) (allowing parol evidence to establish the knowledge of the agent on grounds that
such is allowable to refute an allegation of fraud)).
31. With or without a causation requirement, alleged misrepresentations must still pass muster
under the five-element Strickland test before they become "significant." See supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
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the insurer" and with its "falsity ... known to the applicant." 32 However, in
life insurance matters, the insurance carrier must establish these elements
without the testimony of the claimant because of the "Dead Man's" Statute.33
The "Dead Man's" Statute states:
[N]o party to an action or proceeding, no person who has a legal or
equitable interest which may be affected by the event of the action or
proceeding ... shall be examined in regard to any transaction or communication between such witness and a person at the time of such examination
deceased ... when such examination or any judgment or determination in
such action or proceeding can in any manner affect the interest of such
34
witness or the interest previously owned or represented by him.
Therefore, proof of intent and known falsity becomes difficult at best, 35 and
perhaps even more troubling when a question arises as to whether the decedent
36
actually filled out the application.
Unlike other states' laws that have no causation requirement, South
37
Carolina considers the rights of the parties open to dispute even after death.
In Carrollthe South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted section 38-63-220(d)
to allow an insurer to challenge the truthfulness of the applicant's answers
"during the first two years of the policy." 3 While the statute's purpose is

32. Strickland v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 278 S.C. 82, 86, 292 S.E.2d 301, 304
(1982). Good faith misrepresentations are necessarily excluded.
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
34. Id.
35. Consider S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-70 (Law. Co-op. 1985), which states:
In any proceeding in any of the courts of this State in which any transaction shall be
impeached for fraud by ... any ... person interested in establishing such fraud the
survivor or survivors of the parties to such alleged fraud, when one or more of such
parties shall be dead, shall be competent and compellable to testify in behalf of such
... person interested in establishing such fraud, any law, rule or usage to the
contrary notwithstanding. But nothing herein shall render such survivor or survivors
competent to testify in relation to such transaction in their own behalf in any
proceeding instituted by him or them....
Id.; see also Clarke v. Home Fund Life Ins. Co., 79 S.C. 494, 61 S.E. 80 (1908) (insurer's
agent not allowed to testify concerning a parol agreement with decedent). But see Strickland, 278
S.C. at 84, 292 S.E.2d at 302 (noting that the decedent was unaware that he had terminal cancer
when he made a life insurance contract, but beneficiaries were allowed to recover on the
policies).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23; see also Carroll v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
304 S.C. 491, 494, 405 S.E.2d 425, 427 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 307 S.C. 267, 414 S.E.2d 777
(1992) (discussing the evidentiary difficulties of proof after the insured dies).
37. See Carroll,307 S.C. at 269-70,414 S.E.2d at 778.
38. Id. at 269, 414 S.E.2d at 778. For a list of provisions required in life insurance policies
issued within the state, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220(d) (Law. Co-op. 1989).
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to provide a two year window for an insurer to contest an application, this
interpretation runs contrary to the actual statutory language used by the South
Carolina General Assembly.39 A reasonable reading of the statute reveals
that the contestability period remains effective so long as the insured remains
alive.4" Indeed, the court of appeals adopted this position by holding:
[S]ection [38-63-220] provides, in effect, that if an insurer institutes
proceedings to vacate a policy on the grounds of misrepresentations
contained in the policy application, the proceedings must commence during
the lifetime of the insured and within a period of two years from the date
of the issue of the policy. Even if this section applies only to offensive
actions (such as a complaint seeking recision) and not to defensive actions
such as the avoidance pleaded in this case, the statute, nevertheless, clearly
indicates the legislative intent that policies should not be forfeited if the
insurer attempts to void a policy after the death of the insured.41
Other states not requiring a causal link adopt this stance. For example, in
Terry v. New York Life Insurance Co.42 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied Missouri law and held that the rights and obligations of the parties at
the insured's death were "'fixed and absolute . . . [and that] . . . the sums
insured become a purely legal demand giving the parties the right to have the
issue tried by a jury'". 43
The previously discussed precedent indicates a possibility that the supreme
court adopted a rather harsh rule favoring insurance companies. However, the
supreme court could have adopted a more stringent rule. In Ratliff v. Coastal
Plain Life Insurance Co. 44 the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
North Carolina law. Following a determination by the trial court that
misrepresentations in an insurance application made the policy voidable under
North Carolina law, the court stated:
"[I1n an application for a policy of life insurance, written questions relating
to health and written answers thereto are deemed material as a matter of

39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220(d) (Law. Co-op. 1989) (stating that policy and benefits
"are incontestable as to the truth of the application ... and to the representations of the insured
individual afterthey have been inforce during the lifetime of the insuredfora periodof two years
from their date of issue.) (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Carroll v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 304 S.C. 491,495,405 S.E.2d 425,427 (Ct. App.
1991) (emphasis added), rev'd, 307 S.C. 267, 414 S.E.2d 777 (1992).
42. 104 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1939).
43. Id. at 501 (quoting Wollums v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 46 S.W.2d 259
(Mo. 1931)). In Missouri, no equitable action may be brought to cancel a policy after the
insured's death. Id. Such an action is, of course, permitted while the insured is still alive. Id.
44. 270 S.C. 373, 242 S.E.2d 424 (1978).
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law. The inquiry for the jury is whether or not insured made the statement
and whether or not it was false. If insured made the statement and if it
was false, the question as to whether it was fraudulently, knowingly or
innocently made is of no importance. The statement in either case is
45
material as a matter of law, and the policy will be avoided."

The South Carolina Supreme Court correctly joined the majority of states
in redirecting state law away from a causation requirement. While the court's
opinion could have been more elaborate, the result accomplished is more
equitable than the previous rule. As the appellant's brief suggested, a
causation requirement rewards the unscrupulous and punishes the honest.46
Further, unlike the earlier property insurance policy cases, a life insurance
policy contains nothing to sever in the event of fraud in either the application
or the claim, but not both.47 However, causal links may not be long
removed from South Carolina's life insurance jurisprudence. Noting that
states requiring a causal connection have done so by legislative fiat,48 the
South Carolina Supreme Court invited the General Assembly to do the
same.

Eric A. Paine

45. Id. at 377, 242 S.E.2d at 425 (second emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting
Rhinehardt v. North Carolina Mutual Life Ins. Co., 119 S.E.2d 614, 616 (N.C. 1961)). The
court tempered the harshness of this rule by agreeing to consider statements regarding "temporary
indispositions" or questions necessarily answered by an opinion as nonmaterial. Id. at 377, 242
S.E.2d at 425-26. But see, e.g., Berger v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah
1986) (determining materiality of a misrepresentation by the extent to which it initially influenced
insurer to assume risk, measured atthe time risk is assumed, and by the probable and reasonable
effect that truthful disclosure would have had upon insurer in assessing the advantages of the
proposed contract).
46. See Brief of Appellant at 7-8. The appellant argued that the causation element was
counter intuitive because it encouraged those with reason to misrepresent their health histories to
do so. Id. Such persons would gamble that they would survive the two year contestability period
or that the insurance company would not be able to establish conclusively a link between their
death and perfidy. On the other hand, those who fully disclosed their health histories ran the risk
of higher premiums or outright denial of a policy. See id.
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. See Carroll v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 307 S.C. 267, 270, 414 S.E.2d 777, 778
(1992) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-418 (1986); Mo. REV.STAT § 376.580 (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 27-4-10 (1989)). The statutes cited by the court are almost uniform in their language.
These statutes declare that no misrepresentation is material, and no policy is voidable, unless it
actually contributes to the contingency or event upon which the policy becomes due or payable.
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